We investigate what can be learned about the prevalence of work disability using self-reported assessments of work capacity. Although health status is widely recognized as a crucial determinant of labor supply behavior and participation in public transfer programs, there is a long-standing debate about the reliability of self-reported indicators. Anderson and Burkhauser (1985), in fact, labeled the appropriate use of health controls "the major unsettled issue in the empirical literature on the labor supply of older workers," and the debate has only grown stronger over time. Rather than focus on assumptions required to obtain point identi…cation, we take a step back to evaluate what can be inferred about disability rates under a variety of assumptions that are weaker but arguably more credible than those imposed in the existing literature.
INTRODUCTION
¤ We have bene…ted from the comments of Kelly DeRango and seminar participants at the University of Virginia, the 2001 ASSA meetings, and the 2001 Summer Econometrics Society Meetings.
Health status is widely recognized as a crucial determinant of labor supply behavior and participation in public transfer programs. In recent years, however, it has become increasingly apparent that inferences about the e¤ects of disability status on participation outcomes are sensitive to the way health is measured. Importantly for policy analysis, inferences about the impacts of economic variables correlated with health can also be quite sensitive to the choice of health controls. For example, Anderson and Burkhauser's (1984) estimated wage elasticity of work participation varied …ve-fold depending on the type of measure used to control for work ability; they labeled the appropriate use of health controls "the major unsettled issue in the empirical literature on the labor supply of older workers," and the debate has only grown stronger over time. Ongoing debates regarding the in ‡uence of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) policy on falling labor force participation rates have also focused in part on the reliability of self-reported disability information [e.g., Haveman and Wolfe (1984) vs. Parsons (1984) ; Bound (1991b) vs. Parsons (1991) ]. 1 This paper considers the problem of drawing inferences on the prevalence of work disability using self-reports of work capacity. Many labor force participation studies control for disability status based on subjective self-reports of limitation, such as responses to questions of the form: "Do you have a health impairment that limits the kind or amount of work you can perform?" We examine the prevalence rate of "true disability" among respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a survey of persons nearing retirement that is commonly used to evaluate the e¤ects of disability on the behavior of older persons.
After describing these data in the next section, Section 3 formalizes the identi…-cation problem created by misreporting. To draw inferences about disability status, researchers invariably impose strong assumptions restricting the nature of misreporting. Most studies treat subjective self-reports of work limitation as accurate relative to thresholds speci…ed by social norms or by disability program administrators. Benitez-Silva, Chan, Rust, and Sheidvasseret (1997), for example, explicitly assume that all self-reports of work incapacity are accurate relative to the Social Security Administration's (SSA) de…nition of disability and use these self-reports to calculate Type I and Type II errors in the SSA's adjudication process.
In contrast, many researchers are skeptical of the accuracy of self-reports. Bound and Burkhauser (1999) , for example, suggest the possibility that "those who apply for SSDI and especially those who are awarded bene…ts tend to exaggerate the extent of their work limitations (relative to those who do not apply)..." Eligibility for disability transfers is speci…cally tied to diminished work capacity. Others (e.g., Bowe, 1993) have argued that the threshold for claiming disability may be lower for those who …nd themselves out of the labor force, either by choice or through involuntarily unemployment. Some people out of the labor force prior to the normal retirement age may rationalize their nonwork status as driven mostly by their health conditions instead of by other factors such as high preferences for leisure or unlucky labor market outcomes.
Studies that have modeled and assessed the reliability of self-reported work limitations have not been able to resolve these issues. Stern (1989) and Dwyer and Mitchell (1998) , for example, accept the hypothesis that labor market outcomes do not a¤ect reporting behavior. In contrast, Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) , O'Donnell (1998) and Kreider (1999 Kreider ( , 2000 reject this hypothesis. Using di¤erent approaches, these studies estimate large reporting errors that are systematically related to labor force status. All of these studies, however, impose strong parametric assumptions on the reporting error process.
Given the unresolved controversy about the validity of self-reported health measures, the current study does not focus on providing point estimates of the true disability rate; instead, we take a step back to evaluate what can be inferred about the disability rate under a variety of nonparametric assumptions that are weaker but arguably more credible than those imposed in the existing literature. Using methods developed by Horowitz and Manski (1995) , Section 4 considers what can be learned if one is willing to assume only an upper bound on the fraction of inaccurate disability reports. Sections 5 and 6 extend the nonparametric bounds literature. First, we evaluate what can be inferred when certain observed subgroups are assumed to provide valid self-reports. We also allow for the possibility that some fraction of respondents in a veri…ed subgroup may provide inaccurate reports, a generalization especially useful for sensitivity analysis. In our application, we …nd that the disability bounds can be narrowed substantially. We next consider the identifying power of linking true disability status and the probability of employment. In Section 7, we consider a monotone instrumental variable assumption (Manski and Pepper, 2000) that the true disability rate rises weakly with age. Combining this assumption with other restrictions, we can nearly achieve point identi…cation. Importantly, the 90% con…dence intervals for the true disability rate often do not include the self-reported disability rate.
The nonparametric models formalized and evaluated in Sections 4-7 allow researchers to layer successively stronger assumptions on misreporting behavior. In each section, we estimate models under speci…c assumptions that appear to have broad consensus and evaluate the sensitivity of the estimated bounds to those assumptions. Section 8 concludes.
DATA
Our analysis uses data from the longitudinal Health and Retirement Study, a nationally representative survey of 7608 households whose heads were nearing retirement age (aged 51-61) at the time of the initial interview in 1992-93. To date, subsequent phone interviews have been administered every two years. The HRS has become an especially popular data source for studying the e¤ects of health status and public policy on work behavior of older persons because of its detailed information about health and disability, work history, and participation in public transfer programs. The …rst wave is comprised of 12,652 respondents (heads and other adult household members), all of which are used in this study. 2 Some of our analysis also exploits information from the second wave. For each respondent, we observe self-reported disability indicators, labor force participation status, and whether the respondent received government assistance for a disability. We also use information about the respondent's age. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our sample. Beginning with Frame A, 21.5% of the respondents responded in the a¢rmative to the question, "Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?" Respondents were also asked about current job status: "Are you working now, temporarily laid o¤, unemployed and looking for work, disabled and unable to work, retired, a homemaker, or what?" About 9% indicated that they were disabled and unable to work. Of those who reported that impairments limit the kind or amount of work (above), 42% reported that they were unable to work altogether. Conversely, about 96% of those who reported being unable to work altogether claimed to be limited in the kind or amount of work they could perform (suggesting some misunderstanding or coding errors among the remaining 4%). We classify respondents as work-limited by their own self-assessments (denoted X = 1 below) if they answered yes to either of the disability questions. Using this standard, 21.8% of the respondents in the sample claimed to be disabled.
In addition to self-reported disability measures, we also observe whether the respondent was employed and/or receiving disability bene…ts. In total, 66.2% of respondents identi…ed themselves as currently working for pay, while 10.0% reported that they were receiving disability bene…ts (or were scheduled to begin receiving bene…ts) from Social Security Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, Veterans' Disability, Workers' Compensation, or a state disability program. 3 Frame B shows that there are large variations in the reported disability rates across personal characteristics. Nonworkers, for example, are over four times as likely to report a disability as workers. Predictably, reported disability is positively associated with age and bene…ciary status. As seen in the top frame, however, there is little di¤erence in the self-reports of men and women: 23.0% of the men and 20.8% of the women responded that they were limited in their ability to work.
THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
To evaluate the impact of invalid response on the ability to infer disability, we introduce notation which distinguishes between self-reports and the truth. Let X be the self-reported measure, where X = 1 if the respondent reports a limitation and 0 otherwise. 4 Let W = 1 indicate that the individual is truly disabled relative to social norms, with W = 0 otherwise. Finally, let Z indicate whether a respondent provides accurate information, with Z = 1 if W = X and Z = 0 otherwise. We are interested in making inferences about the unobserved true disability rate, P (W = 1). 5 Some fraction, P (X = 1; Z = 0), inaccurately report being disabled (false positives) relative to accepted standards while others, P (X = 0; Z = 0), inaccurately report being able-bodied (false negatives). Thus, the true and reported disability rates are related as follows:
The observed disability rate equals the true disability rate if the fraction of false negative reports exactly o¤sets the fraction of false positive reports. The data, however, only identify the fraction of the population who self-report disability, P (X = 1). The sampling process cannot identify the fraction who falsely claim disability or who falsely claim to be able-bodied.
LOWER BOUNDS ON ACCURATE REPORTS
We now evaluate what can be inferred about the disability rate P (W = 1) given prior information on the fraction of respondents who provide valid self-reports. In particular, suppose
where v is a known lower bound on the accurate reporting rate. By varying the value of v, we can e¤ectively consider the wide range of views characterizing the debate on inaccurate reporting. Those believing that all reports are accurate set v = 1, in which case the sampling process identi…es the disability rate (e.g., Benitez-Silva et al., 1997). Those believing that all reports are potentially inaccurate (e.g., Myers, 4 Except for the material in Section 6, we do not condition on observed covariates. In practice, we …nd that conditioning on these variables makes almost no di¤erence for the qualitative conclusions. 5 One common assumption applied in analyses of misreporting is that invalid reporting errors are independent of the outcome of interest. That is, P (W = 1) = P (X = 1jZ = 1): Under this independence assumption, termed the contaminated sampling model by Horowitz and Manski (1995) , the true population disability rate equals the reported rate among those accurately revealing their disability status. Whether this model applies has implicitly been a matter of considerable disagreement in the labor supply literature. Benitez-Silva et al. (1997) , for example, argue that misreporting is exogenous to the extent that it exists it all. Of course, others have argued that misreporting may in fact be related to whether a person is disabled. We present results for only the more general corrupt sampling model which allows for arbitrary misreporting. Corresponding results for the contaminated sampling case are available upon request for all the propositions and proofs in this paper.
1982; Bowe, 1993) set v = 0, in which case the sampling process is uninformative. Middle ground positions can be evaluated by setting v somewhere between 0 and 1.
In fact, the existing literature provides a number of plausible restrictions. Concerns over misreporting are generally based on two distinct observations, one …-nancial and one social. First, eligibility for some government assistance programs (e.g., SSDI) is tied to both earnings and disability status. Program applicants have …nancial incentives to exaggerate work limitations (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999) . Second, many people (especially men) may believe that they are expected to work until normal retirement age unless their ability to work is impaired (Bound, 1991a) .
Although some respondents clearly have incentives to misreport limitation, those in a number of observed subgroups have few economic or psychological incentives to misreport. 6 Employed respondents, for example, are generally ineligible for government assistance and face neither strong social nor …nancial pressures to misreport. 7 Likewise, there appear to be few incentives to falsely claim to be able-bodied. Some might …nd it reasonable to assume that recent Disability Insurance bene…ciaries -who faced stringent disability screening and are o¢cially deemed incapable of substantial work -can be considered a veri…ed work-limited subgroup. Still others might exploit information from repeated interviews (e.g., in the HRS) to identify veri…ed subgroups. For example, if a respondent reports being able-bodied in one wave despite being unemployed, then one might be willing to label that respondent as an accurate reporter in other waves even if a disability is claimed.
The fraction of the caseload without apparent incentives to exaggerate limitations might be used to provide an upper bound v. In our data, 10% of the respondents are disability bene…ciaries, 27% claimed no disability in the second wave of the survey despite being out of the labor force, 66% of the respondents were gainfully employed, 78% claimed no work limitation in wave 1, and 92% of the respondents satis…ed at least one of these criteria. In this section, we evaluate what can be learned about the true disability rate if all that is known is that at least some percentage of the caseload provides valid reports. We do not assume that respondents from any particular subgroup provide valid reports -only that a lower bound on the aggregate fraction of accurate reporters is available.
Nonparametric Bounds
6 Certainly, arguments could be made that some respondents in any of these groups might misreport work limitation. Social or economic pressures may in ‡uence some workers, for instance, to downplay a disability. Further, some respondents may not know how to accurately answer questions about health status so that there is measurement error in the reported indicators. These methods, however, apply to any model of misreporting (including measurement error) so long as one has some prior information restricting the invalid response rate. 7 Kreider (1999), for example, explicitly assumes that all workers provide valid reports. Stern (1989) also explicitly assumes that misreporting is related to work outcomes.
Suppose that no more than some known fraction, 1 ¡ v, of the population misreports disability status. In the absence of additional information, it might be that 1 ¡ v percent of the population incorrectly reports being disabled. At the other extreme, it might be that this fraction incorrectly reports being able-bodied. Thus, from (1) we know that
These bounds are derived by Horowitz and Manski (1995, Proposition, Corollary 1.2). Henceforth, we will refer to these as the HM bounds. Intuitively, the bounds narrow as the upper bound misreporting rate 1 ¡ v declines. In our application, the HM bounds remain completely uninformative unless it can be assumed that the accurate reporting rate exceeds 0.218; the lower bound is zero unless it is known that at least 78.2% of responses are accurate. Table 2 presents the estimated HM bounds and 90% bootstrap con…dence intervals under various assumptions about the proportion of accurate reports. 8 If only 10% of respondents are known to provide accurate reports of work limitation, the HM bounds are uninformative. In contrast, if it is known that at least 66% of respondents provide accurate reports, then the true disability rate is estimated to lie within [0, 0.556]. Under the weak upper bound assumptions explored in this section, the self-reported disability measures provide only modest information on the true disability rate unless the veri…cation probability v is large.
VERIFICATION OF OBSERVED SUBGROUPS
Arguably, certain observed subgroups provide valid reports. As suggested above, workers, the able-bodied, disability bene…ciaries, and others have few economic or psychological incentives to misreport. In this section, we evaluate what can be learned about the true disability rate when an observed subgroup (e.g., workers) is known to provide valid reports. 9 This veri…cation assumption narrows the HM bounds by e¤ectively shrinking the pool of false positive reports and the pool of false negative reports. 10 Formally, let Y indicate whether a respondent's self-report of disability is veri…ed to be accurate, where Y = 1 if the report is veri…ed and Y = 0 otherwise. Using the law of total probability, we can decompose the true disability rate by subgroups:
8 The 90% con…dence interval re ‡ects the 0.05 quantile of the bootstrapped distribution (from 500 pseudo samples) of the lower bound and the 0.95 quantile of the bootstrapped distribution of the upper bound. 9 In other contexts, this assumption has been evaluated under the case of contaminated sampling (see footnote 5) by Lambert and Tierney (1997) and Dominitz and Sherman (1998). 1 0 We assume that the lower bound accurate reporting rate v equals the fraction of cases in veri…ed groups. This assumption can be relaxed by allowing the lower bound probability on accurate reporting to exceed the veri…cation probability.
Under the veri…cation assumption, the data reveal the fraction of veri…ed cases, P (Y = 1); and the disability rate among the veri…ed cases, P (W = 1jY = 1) = P (X = 1jY = 1). We have no prior information about the validity of self-reports from the unveri…ed cases, so it might be that all unveri…ed cases are disabled or able-bodied. 11 Thus, we have: Proposition 1: Given P (Y = 1) = v and P (Z = 1jY = 1) = 1, P (X = 1; Y = 1) · P (W = 1) · P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (Y = 0): Intuitively, in this informational setting the true disability rate can be no less than the reported rate among veri…ed cases and no greater than this rate plus the fraction of unveri…ed cases. Thus, the width of this bound is the fraction of unveri…ed cases, P (Y = 0). If, for example, all workers provide accurate reports about limitation, then the true disability rate must be at least as high as the fraction of workers claiming limitation but no larger than this fraction plus the fraction of nonworkers.
Notice that validating certain observed subgroups provides additional information beyond just an upper bound on the degree of corruption. In particular, the validation bound in Proposition 1 is narrower than the HM bound derived using only the upper bound misreporting rate. Without validation, it might be that 1 ¡ v percent of respondents falsely claim to be disabled (or able-bodied). With validation, the upper bound fraction of persons falsely claiming to be disabled equals the fraction of unveri…ed cases who report being disabled, P (X = 1; Y = 0), which is a subset of the fraction of all unveri…ed cases P (Y = 0) = 1 ¡ v. Similarly, the upper bound fraction of false negatives under veri…cation is bounded by P (X = 0; Y = 0); a subset of the unveri…ed cases. At least one of the bounds will be tighter.
Results
The width of the veri…cation bound depends on the lower bound accurate reporting rate v = P (Y = 1) and the reported disability rate P (X = 1) as well as the fraction of veri…ed respondents reporting disabilities, P (X = 1jY = 1): In contrast to the HM bounds, the bounds under partial veri…cation are always informative for v > 0. Veri…cation has the greatest impact on the bounds for middle-range values of v; as the lower bound accurate reporting rate v approaches one, the HM bounds converge to the self-reported disability rate P (X = 1).
The right-hand side of Table 2 displays the estimated disability rate bounds under veri…cation. If workers alone are validated, for example, then the true disability rate is estimated to lie within [0:064; 0:402]. If all the groups previously discussed are veri…ed, then the true disability rate is estimated to lie within the six point range of [0:156; 0:218]. 12 The veri…cation bounds can be substantially more informative than 1 1 Note that this model is precisely the case of censored outcomes considered by Manski (1995) . 1 2 A particularly simple result for the upper bound arises if those reporting to be able-bodied are considered veri…ed. In this case, the possibility of misreporting is the HM bounds evaluated in the previous section. When only workers are veri…ed, for example, the width of the 90% con…dence interval on the disability rate reduces from 57 points to 35 points.
Partial Veri…cation of Subgroups
Thus far, we have assumed that all respondents in a veri…ed subgroup provide valid reports. An important middle ground informational setting arises if there is only partial information about an observed subgroup. As in the HM framework, there may be subgroups for which one only knows an upper bound on the degree of inaccurate reporting. Suppose, for example, that diagnostic tests used to evaluate health status and determine eligibility for assistance programs are only e¤ective up to some known error rate (see, e.g., Parsons, 1996) . Then, SSDI recipients would be partially veri…ed. Likewise, those with few social or …nancial incentives to misreport (e.g., workers) may nevertheless be unable to accurately assess the degree to which they are disabled. For certain observed groups, researchers may be willing to at least assume a lower bound on the accurate reporting rate.
Formally, assume that at least some fraction v y of the self-reports are known to be accurate such that P (Z = 1jY = 1)¸v y . In this case, the disability rate for the partially veri…ed subgroup is not identi…ed. Instead, applying the HM bounds in (3), we …nd
The data are uninformative about the unveri…ed subgroup, Y = 0. Combining (4) and (5) reveals: Proposition 2: Under the partial veri…cation assumption P (Z = 1jY = 1)¸v y ,
Intuitively, the bounds widen if respondents in veri…ed subgroups may misreport. Still, for a su¢ciently large lower bound accurate reporting rate v y , partial veri…ca-tion improves on the HM bounds in (3). 13 Consider, for example, the HM bound limited to those reporting disability, so the upper bound is simply the reported disability rate, P (X = 1). 1 3 In particular, the lower bound exceeds the HM lower bound if
and the upper bound is smaller than the HM upper bound if
where v = 0:662; the fraction of workers. If we assume partial veri…cation on workers, then the upper bound in Proposition 2 represents an improvement over the HM bound if it is known that at least 76% of workers provide valid responses; the lower bound is improved if it is known that at least 90% of workers provide valid responses.
MONOTONICITY AND VERIFICATION
In addition to assuming that certain subgroups are veri…ed (or partially veri…ed), one might also be willing to impose restrictions on the relationship between disability and other observed characteristics. A seemingly innocuous assumption, for example, is that disability status is monotonically related to employment status. Disabilities, by de…nition, limit one's capacity to work, ceteris paribus. Let L = 1 indicate that a respondent participated in the labor force, with L = 0 otherwise. Formally, we separately consider the implications of two distinct monotonicity restrictions:
The …rst assumption states directly that the truly disabled are less likely to work. The second assumption states that the employment probability among those providing valid responses (veri…ed or not) is higher for the able-bodied than for the disabled.
14 Throughout this section, we assume that all workers are veri…ed and allow for the possibility that respondents in other observed subgroups are veri…ed as well. 15 Monotonicity Assumption A implies the informative restriction that the probability that workers are disabled can be no greater than the probability that nonworkers are disabled:
Combining (4) and (6) Notice that if only workers are veri…ed (e.g., Kreider, 1999) , the proposition simpli…es to P (X = 1jY = 1) · P (W = 1): Since the lower bound on the disability rate among nonworkers increases from 0 to the observed disability rate for workers, the monotonicity assumption has identifying power. In particular, since the lower bound under veri…cation equals P (X = 1; Y = 1), the monotonicity assumption increases this bound by the inverse of the veri…cation probability, 1=P (Y = 1). The smaller the fraction of veri…ed cases, the greater the identifying power of the monotonicity assumption. Monotonicity Assumption B restricts the relationship between able-bodied and disabled accurate reporters. This makes it useful to rewrite the prevalence rate for true disability as
where ¢ = P (X = 1; Z = 1; Y = 0) ¡ P (X = 0; Z = 1; Y = 0) measures the unidenti…ed di¤erence between the numbers of disabled and able-bodied who provide accurate but unveri…ed reports. Assumption B raises the lower bound on the disability rate by constraining the di¤erence between the two unobserved probabilities in ¢. This assumption e¤ectively reveals the existence of some truly disabled individuals (W = 1) within the unveri…ed subpopulation. In particular, we derive the following proposition in the appendix: Proposition 3B: Monotonicity Assumption B and the veri…cation assumptions P (Z = 1jL = 1) = P (Z = 1jY = 1) = 1 imply: If only workers' reports are veri…ed, the bound simpli…es to
Since the lower bound under veri…cation alone equals P (X = 1; Y = 1), the monotonicity assumption is informative whenever P (X = 0; Y = 0) > 0. Table 3 displays the estimated bounds and 90% con…dence intervals under the monotonicity assumptions. In our application, these monotonicity assumptions tend to modestly raise the lower bound. When only workers are veri…ed, for example, Assumption A increases the lower bound from 6% to 10%, while under assumption B the lower bound increases to 8%. When disability bene…ciaries are veri…ed, the monotonicity assumptions are uninformative.
MONOTONICITY WITHOUT VERIFICATION: MIV BOUNDS
There may also be known monotonic relationships between the disability rate and unveri…ed subpopulations. Arguably, for instance, the true disability rate is nondecreasing with the age of respondents. Formally, let u measure the age of the respondent and let LB(u) and UB(u) be the known lower and upper bounds, respectively, given the available information on the true disability rate, P (W = 1ju): Age is a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) if the true disability rate weakly increases with u. Under this restriction, Manski and Pepper (2000, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1) show that
There are no other restrictions implied by the MIV assumption. To …nd the MIV bounds on the unconditional disability rate, one takes the appropriate weighted average of the upper and lower bounds across the di¤erent values of the instrument. 16 Since the MIV assumption alone has no identifying power, we combine this assumption with the various veri…cation and monotonicity assumptions presented in Sections 4-6. Based on the age composition of respondents in the HRS, we divide the sample into seven age groups: those younger than 51, …ve two-year age groups between 51 and 60, and those older than 60.
As seen in Table 4 , the assumption that age is an MIV appears to have substantial identifying power. Under the restriction that only workers are veri…ed (and imposing no labor force monotonicity assumptions from Section 6), the disability rate is estimated to lie within [0.071, 0.322]. The MIV assumption reduces the range of uncertainty from 34 points to 25 points. When all the subgroups in the table are veri…ed, the MIV assumption e¤ectively narrows the bounds to a point: the estimated lower bound of 0.158 is almost exactly the upper bound of 0.157. 17 Notice that the upper bound under the MIV assumption is often less than the self-reported disability rate of 0.218. In some cases, the 90% con…dence interval under the MIV assumption is strictly less than the con…dence interval for the selfreported disability rate. Thus, as long as disability does not decline with age, these results suggest that conventional models which presume valid self-reports may be misspeci…ed.
CONCLUSION
To draw inferences about disability status and the relationship between disability and participation decisions, researchers invariably impose strong assumptions that restrict the nature of misreporting. The strength of the conclusions one can draw, however, depends on the credibility and strength of the assumptions one is willing to impose. In the absence of assumptions about the prevalence of false positive and false negative reports of work capacity, the true disability rate could lie anywhere between 0 and 100 percent. With stronger and often untenable restrictions, this uncertainty can be substantially mitigated or even eliminated -but then uncertainty arises regarding the validity of the maintained assumptions. Ultimately, replacing one form of uncertainty with another does little to resolve the debate. This paper has explored middle ground information settings. Although we are unable to exactly identify disability rates except in special cases, our framework allows us to impose credible assumptions that provide informative bounds. Layering successively stronger veri…cation and monotonicity assumptions, we narrow the bounds in our application such that the estimated true disability rate for respondents nearing retirement age lies within a six-point range. Under the assumption that the true disability rate weakly increases with age, the bounds are narrowed even further. In this case, the 90% con…dence intervals often do not include the selfreported disability rate, thus casting doubt on the validity of treating self-reports as accurate. 
